



25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

TOP SECRET

4 March 1965

25X1




Copy No. C 5-7



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed



25X

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

4 March 1965


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS



25X1

2. France-USSR: Paris advises Moscow it is prepared to explore means to end Vietnamese war provided no prior conditions are set. (Page 3)



25X1


5. USSR: Government decree restores ministerial form of organization over defense industries. (Page 7)



25X1

8. Tanzania-Germany: President Nyerere maneuvering on question of relations with West and East Germany. (Page 11)

9. EEC: Merger of the three communities important primarily for psychological impact and contribution to administrative efficiency. (Page 12)



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

France-USSR: [Paris has advised Moscow that it is "disposed to concert" with the USSR to explore a means to end the Vietnamese war if Moscow imposes no prior conditions to an international conference.]

[The official French reply to Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov's 23 February demarche to De Gaulle reiterated De Gaulle's statement that Paris would enter into bilateral consultations only if the USSR would drop its condition that any conference must be preceded by cessation of US attacks against North Vietnam. The French contended that acceptance of any preconditions for a conference would only lead to counterconditions, thus effectively nullifying any possibility that a conference could actually be convened. In the reply, Paris repeated its position that peace can be re-established in Vietnam only by an international conference based on the principles of the 1954 or 1962 Geneva agreements.]

[Commenting on the De Gaulle-Vinogradov meeting, the former French ambassador to Moscow, Maurice De Jean, stated that he assumed De Gaulle had made clear that the French rejection of preconditions was directed at the "ridiculous Chinese demand that the US quit Southeast Asia beforehand."]

25X1

4 March 65

3

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

*USSR: The Soviet Government's decree restoring a ministerial form of organization over its defense industries reverses another of Khrushchev's major reforms.

The industries involved are aviation, shipbuilding, defense (largely ground armaments), radio electronics, atomic energy, and general machine building (function unknown). These industries in recent years had been transferred from a centralized ministerial system of administration to a system of state committees. Khrushchev sponsored this move in order to break up the entrenched industrial bureaucracies in Moscow. The new decree will probably be portrayed as a step to improve the administration of this key area of the economy. It does not appear to signal an increase in the influence of the military establishment.

Although the full implications of this action are uncertain, it is presumed that these ministries will recover the responsibilities for plant management and control of supplies that they had lost. The reorganization, however, does not necessarily foreshadow similar changes in all branches; other decisions by the new regime suggest increased local direction of consumer-oriented industries.

Indications appeared immediately following Khrushchev's ouster that changes in the administration of industry were being discussed. Proposals for a return to a ministerial system were made in the press in early December and the question was the subject

(continued)

of some controversy at the session of the Supreme Soviet later that month. The fact that a decision affecting at least one major part of economic administration has now been made might indicate that the power balance in the leadership has begun to shift, but it is still too early to pinpoint the personalities in the leadership involved.

25X1

The changes have no apparent relation to the current international situation.

--	--	--

25X1

[* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.]

4 March 65

8

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

Tanzania-Germany: President Nyerere is still maneuvering around the problem of Tanzania's relations with West and East Germany.

Earlier this week he "rejected" West German economic aid in retaliation for Bonn's withdrawal of its military training mission in Tanzania. Nyerere has told a foreign journalist that he has no intention of granting diplomatic recognition to East Germany, but he may well permit an East German Consulate General either in Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar.

Bonn withdrew the training mission because Nyerere would not give assurances that the jurisdiction of the East German Consulate General would be restricted to Zanzibar, where it was first established as an embassy before the union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika. Nyerere's latest argument for Western consumption is that, having "ousted" the West Germans, he can decide about the East Germans without being accused of knuckling under to Bonn.

Meanwhile, rumors are floating as to who will replace the West German military mission. Polish and Czech officials in Tanzania reportedly have said that they would be willing to fill the gap. [The Canadians, however, have stated that Tanzania has asked them to take over.] The West German mission left behind all its equipment, including eight aircraft and four patrol boats.

25X1

25X1

EEC: [The 2 March agreement to merge the executives of the three European communities is important primarily for its psychological impact and its contribution to administrative efficiency.]

[The effect of the merger is to bring under the purview of a single commission seated in Brussels the executive and policy-forming prerogatives presently exercised by the EEC and EURATOM commissions and the Coal-Steel Community High Authority.]

[The combined executive should have greater prestige and influence than its predecessors, and Brussels will be more firmly established as the community's administrative center. Several important European institutions will still be housed in Luxembourg, however, and as long as the European Parliament is in Strasbourg the community will be lacking a true "capital."]

[The reasons for France's recent support of a move which enhances the Brussels "bureaucracy" are not entirely clear. Executive merger will, however, pave the way for consideration of combining the three community treaties--during the course of which Paris is expected to try to water down their supranational features. It would, of course, require the consent of the other five members to do this.]

25X1

4 March 65

12

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6

~~TOP SECRET~~